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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of strategic position on the ability of an
entrepreneurial firm to successfully develop and deploy electronic personal health records technology
within the US healthcare industry.
Design/methodology/approach – This study uses an in-depth longitudinal case study methodology.
Findings – The study contributes by juxtaposing a longitudinal view of how the focal firm proposed
and acted on different strategic positions in an attempt to achieve development and deployment
success. In doing so, the study also elaborates on Porter’s recognition that firms need to make
trade-offs when choosing a strategic position, as the purposeful limitation of service offerings can
protect against the degradation of existing value creating activities.
Research limitations/implications – The authors’ study highlights the enormous challenge of
facilitating the adoption and diffusion of technology enabled interventions in the US healthcare
ecosystem. Future research that combines both interdisciplinary and multi-level investigation and
analysis is sorely needed to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the phenomenon and to
encourage the development and deployment of useful technology enabled interventions within the US
healthcare industry.
Practical implications – While the fragmented nature of the healthcare industry provides
opportunities for entrepreneurial firms, such complexity within the ecosystem should not be
underestimated as a reason for concern for small firms.
Social implications – Total economic burden due to chronic diseases and other healthcare-related
expenses is massive for the USA. Consequently, prevention and early detection of future disease states
has become a core component of the current healthcare reform debate. EPHRs are considered one core
component of a broader healthcare strategy to improve health outcomes and lower costs. By deepening
our understanding of how best to develop and deploy such interventions, society will surely benefit.
Originality/value – The longitudinal nature of the authors’ study provides a unique opportunity to
understand the dynamic interrelationships between context, position, and performance within the US
healthcare industry.
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Introduction: flattening the cost curve with ePHRs
Exploding healthcare costs in the USA are projected to double in the next decade,
reaching nearly $4.4 trillion by 2018 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
2009). Study after study confirms that an overwhelming percentage of total healthcare
costs are actually preventable, as they are often attributed to the treatment of
preventable chronic conditions, such as obesity, heart disease, and diabetes that can
result from lifestyle choices (Miller et al., 2009). In a continuous search for interventions
that may encourage preventive behaviors and thereby flatten ballooning cost curves,
most people who are trying to fix the healthcare crisis look towards health information
technology, in general (Lemire, 2010; Chaudhry et al., 2006), and electronic personal
health records (ePHRs), more specifically, as a means for supporting prevention and
early detection programs (Loeppke, 2008; Miller et al., 2009). ePHRs build on the ideas
of electronic health records (EHR), which are designed to track patients’ interactions
within the healthcare ecosystem, containing physicians, hospitals, clinics, insurance
companies, etc. (Miller et al., 2009). In the most elementary sense, ePHRs are tools that
allow individual patients to manage their health information (Detmer and Steen, 2006).
Thus, ePHRs foster individuals’ active role in managing their health (Tang et al., 2006)
so that they “become partners in maintaining their health and treating their own
illnesses”. However, to achieve such outcomes a key dependency for a successful ePHR
is that it aggregates patient data across a fragmented landscape of doctors,
laboratories, clinics, and hospitals that inhabit the healthcare ecosystem (see the
Appendix). Unfortunately, it seems that fragmentation in the USA is at an even higher
level than other developed countries, as the private sector and market forces play more
significant roles than other countries (Detmer and Steen, 2006). As a result, the USA
lags significantly behind many of the developed countries in the adoption of health
information technology (Detmer and Steen, 2006). Expectedly, the development and
deployment of an ePHR within such a context is no easy task. The purpose of this
study is to understand more fully some of the challenges and opportunities that exist in
doing so.
A likely user of ePHR technology would be organizations that adopt self-funded
health-insurance strategies. More than 50 percent of US firms pursue such strategies,
providing health insurance for more than half of US workers (Kaiser, 2009).
Understandably, self-insured firms have significant direct incentives to lower the
healthcare costs of their employees[1]. However, self-insured employers are also not
likely to have the in-house resources to develop ePHRs, leaving an opportunity for
existing industry players or entrepreneurs to fill this need. Since a critical success
factor for an ePHR is to aggregate data from many disparate sources, a key challenge
for the development and deployment of ePHRs is the highly fragmented nature of the
healthcare industry, which can disrupt information flows across the many constituents
that make up the patient-delivery-care process (Cebul et al., 2008; Shekelle et al., 2006;
Wilcox et al., 2006). For instance, when a patient has a check-up with a primary care
physician, then visits a specialized practice for blood testing, and finally stops by the
drug store to fill medications, there are three distinct sources of data related to that one
patient. For a central entity (such as an insurance company) to capture those distinct
events, they need to digitally integrate with potentially three different systems. As a
result of this integration complexity, no consistent or agreed-upon standard for how
ePHRs will be offered to self-funded employers has emerged.
While healthcare fragmentation provides opportunities for entrepreneurial firms,
research calls for new ways for firms to compete in such information-intensive
ecosystems. Van de Ven (2005) suggests that since a single firm rarely possesses all of
the resources necessary to develop and commercialize knowledge-intensive
technologies, they should take a broader view of their competitive landscape and
shift their focus to the network level, whereby firms work together in “packs” rather
than as single entities within their industry. In doing so, Van de Ven (2005) points to
the necessity of a firm’s political savvy to operate within a pack. However, in addition
to the importance of political savvy and since firms can often alter the structure of their
pack through their strategic positions, they must pay close attention to the ways in
which their positioning choices impact their ability to develop and deploy an ePHR. For
instance, are they going to position themselves so that they provide services directly to
employer groups and thereby own the customer relationships, or are they going to
focus on providing services to another entity within the ecosystem, thereby giving up
direct access to the employers? Furthermore, what are the benefits and detriments that
result from each positioning decision? The importance of strategic position in the
context of ePHRs leads to our primary research question from the perspective of an
entrepreneurial firm: how does strategic position affect the development and
deployment of an ePHR?
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we introduce a theoretical
framework to guide our study that combines an industry infrastructure and
positioning based perspective. We then review the methodology and introduce the
intensive longitudinal case study, which follows the development and deployment of
an ePHR over a two-year period. Finally, we analyze and discuss the results and of our
case study before concluding with a discussion that highlights our contributions.
Theoretical lens: industry infrastructure and strategic positioning
Van de Ven (2005) proposes that firms be aware of a broad framework of key resource
dependencies and activities and develop political savvy, since firms rarely possess all
of the resources and capabilities that are required to develop and deploy technical
innovations. Van de Ven (2005) describes critical aspects of the development and
commercialization of such innovations in four subsystems:
(1) Institutional arrangements – The governmental agencies, professional trade
associations, and scientific/technical communities that legitimate, regulate, and
standardize a technology.
(2) Resource endowments – These include advancements in basic scientific and
technological knowledge, financing and insurance arrangements, and training
of competent professionals.
(3) Consumer demand – For new-to-the-world technologies, informed, competent,
and responsible consumers do not preexist; the market must be created.
(4) Proprietary activities – These transform the available supply of public
resources (scientific knowledge and work force competence) into proprietary
products and services to meet customer demand.
This framework is useful and applicable to the context of ePHRs, as their success
undoubtedly rests upon the cooperation of many individual firms, each with a unique
contribution. Cho and Mathiassen (2007) utilize this framework as a diagnostic lens to
understand the failure of a telemedicine initiative. They confirmed the need for firms
running in packs to be “political savvy to understand and mobilize the interests of
other players with stakes in an emerging industry” (Van de Ven, 2005, p. 374), the
entrepreneurial firm still failed to propel the innovation further. Though Van de Ven’s
(2005) framework provides a useful lens to focus ones attention on a broad mix of
resources and the relative dependencies that firms should be aware of when developing
and deploying IT-based innovations. There are inherent limitations, too, as it pays
scant attention to the dynamic interrelationships between the four subsystems
mentioned above. Furthermore, the basic notion that firms should cooperate with other
firms in such contexts is not sufficient for helping firms navigate an ecosystem as
complex as the US healthcare industry. For instance, where firms position themselves
within this ecosystem, relative to the customer and other providers, likely have
important tradeoffs that need to be better understood. Therefore, to extend the industry
infrastructure view, we borrow from the positioning view of strategy within the
strategic management literature, once the basic building block of the strategic
management discipline (Porter, 1980, 1996), to explore these important issues.
Strategic positioning
Embedded within the positioning view of strategy is a strong underlying foundation in
systems thinking. In essence, the firm is conceptualized as a system of interconnected
activities and technologies that combine to transform inputs into consumable outputs.
Of course, investing in technology and performing activities incurs costs that are in
addition to those sustained through the procurement of raw materials. The
transformation process will result in products and services that create a level of
utility that consumers are willing to pay a monetary price for, generating revenues for
the firm that will hopefully outweigh the costs incurred during the transformation
process (Porter, 1996). From this general perspective, two firms could share similar
sources of inputs and perform very similar activities, but firm A may perform such
activities more efficiently than firm B, leading to increased levels of operational
effectiveness for firm A. From a different perspective, firm A and firm B might decide
to not only source raw materials from different suppliers or in different ways, but
fundamentally alter the design of their internal activity systems to generate a
completely different set of outputs that are targeted at a unique set of customers. In the
second case, firm A and firm B are considered to have variations in strategic
positioning (Porter, 1996). From this perspective, the positioning view of strategy
makes a clear and important distinction between operational effectiveness and
strategic positioning. It is from this framework that the design of activities becomes the
building blocks of competitive advantage.
Because competitive strategy is about being different, strategy rests on strategic
positioning, or the design of unique activities systems that deliver goods and services
that are unlike those provided by competitive firms (Porter, 1996). For instance, as
Porter illustrates, Southwest Airlines has designed a unique set of activity systems
that offer short-haul, low-cost, point-to-point services between midsize cities while
using secondary airports. This is in contrast to other firms in the industry that use
large airports, fly great distances, and utilize the hub-and-spoke system to reach a
larger number of destinations. Both firms have obvious differences in terms of the
services they provide, but it is most important to realize that these differences result
from designing distinct activities. Essentially, distinctive goods and services result
from distinctive activities, and, together, represent distinct strategic positions.
Porter mentions three diverse sources that shape three types of strategic positions.
First, variety based positioning is based on the unique attributes or characteristics of a
good or a service, rather than focusing on a particular customer group. Regal Nails, the
largest nail salon franchisor in the USA specializes in manicures and pedicures, and does
not offer other services often expected in a full-scale beauty salon. Rather than going to a
full-scale salon that offers nail service as one of many offerings, customers who want
quick, convenient service can go to a Regal Nails store, where all their attention is on
nails. Focusing their attention to this extent allows Regal Nails to design a set of
value-creating activities that allow them to offer manicures and pedicures cheaper and
faster. As Porter mentions, a variety-based position can serve a broad customer base, but
will likely only meet a portion of their overall needs. Second, needs-based positioning is
more closely related to traditional customer segmentation, where activities are designed
to meet the needs of a unique group of customers. Marriott Corporation, a global hotel
management company, manages a suite of brands all aligned to customer groups with
specialized needs. For those seeking a luxurious stay, the Ritz-Carlton and J.W. Marriott
hotels and resorts offer the utmost in service and amenities. For the business traveler
seeking long-term residence, the Residence Inn and TownePlace Suites offer comfortable
accommodation at reasonable rates. Thus, as Porter suggests, Marriott follows a variant
of needs-based positioning in providing services to the same customer who might have
different needs at different times. However, as Porter suggests, simply positioning a firm
relative to differences in customer groups is not adequate for achieving superior
performance. Instead, internal activities must also be sufficiently different to translate
into a meaningful distinction in competitive position. Finally, access-based positioning
results from segmenting customers based on where or how you would reach them. As
Porter suggests, access can result from either scale or geography, or anything that
requires a unique set of activities to reach customers most effectively. Cracker Barrel Old
Country Store, Inc. is an American restaurant and gift chain with a Southern theme.
Traditionally, Cracker Barrel stores were located near highway exits along the Interstate
Highway System to accommodate the discerning needs of travelers seeking a
home-cooked meal. Since then access has grown to include larger suburban residential
areas, likely requiring adjustments to the design of marketing, logistics, and other such
internal activity systems.
Trade-offs of positioning
According to Porter, a strategic position is not sustainable unless trade-offs are made
between other positioning possibilities. The old adage, “You can’t be everything to
everyone” holds here, in that as firms decide on their positions, they must also decide
on what their positions are not. Trade-offs are most recognizable when attention is
again focused on activities themselves. A firm that chooses a needs-based position that
focuses on providing products that meet the needs of low-income families will have to
design activity systems and adopt technologies that are free of waste and unneeded
frills. Therefore, in making this decision they are trading off the possibility of
providing higher-end products and increased customer service (to upper-income
market segments), with the same activity systems that were designed to meet
lower-income needs. This does not mean firms are unable to provide goods and
services to multiple, unique, market segments. What it does mean is that there is an
inevitable tradeoff with doing so, and firms should be intricately aware of the
associated costs. As mentioned earlier, Marriott Corporation is able to meet the needs
of various market segments through individual brands, but this likely does not come
without high coordination costs associated with orchestrating multiple internal
activity systems.
Methodology: longitudinal case study
As Greenhalgh et al. (2009) mention in their meta-analysis of existing ePHR research, a
systematic study of how ePHRs are co-created in practice is sorely needed. This research
project was designed to fill such a gap, by deeply immersing ourselves in the context to
understand how an ePHR is developed in a real life context. The study took place over a
multi-year period and continues as part of a broad initiative to deepen our understanding
of how IT can be developed and deployed to reduce costs and improve the quality of
healthcare in the USA. We leveraged our inside access with key stakeholders of the focal
firm, XYZ Health (based in the Southeastern USA), to follow the development and
deployment of Insight, an ePHR system. XYZ was a small entrepreneurial firm that
consisted of a core nucleus of nine employees, a monthly operating budget of
approximately $40,000, and monthly revenues that averaged around $20,000.
Case study design
Case studies are particularly applicable when:
. “how” and “why” questions are being explored;
. researchers have little control over behavioral events; and
. phenomena are being studied in their real-life contexts (Yin, 2003).
As such, our objective was to gain an in-depth understanding of how a start-up firm
negotiates their position within the complex healthcare ecosystem, and how their
strategies and actions affect the efficacy of their ePHR development and deployment
efforts. For this reason, we adopted the engaged scholarship research approach (Van de
Ven, 2007) to conduct our case study. Engaged scholarship is guided by the need to
study the phenomenon in its natural context and committed to bridging the gap between
theory and practice. Furthermore, because this study explores how a start-up firm alters
their strategic position, the method employed fits well with delving deeply into the focal
firm rather than broadly across the other firms within the pack. We adopted a process,
rather than a variance, perspective to guide our study (Mohr, 1982, Van de Ven, 2007). As
a result, we were more interested in accurately exploring, describing, and explaining the
temporal sequence of events involved in change (Van de Ven and Huber, 1990) for this
single firm, which clearly limits our ability to generalize more broadly. Due to the
revelatory nature of our relationship with XYZ and the lack of extant work in this area,
we chose an exploratory single-case design. According to Yin (2003), the revelatory case
exists when a researcher has a unique opportunity to observe and analyze a phenomenon
that is characteristically inaccessible by a particular research community.
Data collection
To understand the phenomenon more fully and to ensure adequate validity of the
research findings, we leveraged multiple collection techniques and data from different
sources (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2003). Most of our data stemmed from weekly
and bi-weekly semi-structured interviews over a two-year period with the person
responsible for leading the technology development team. The core development team
consisted of the team lead and application architect, a database architect and
programmer, a business analyst, a quality control and testing expert, a physician, and
a healthcare policy expert who was extensively involved in the national healthcare
debate in the USA. This core development team then interfaced with the executive
team consisting of the CEO, COO, and CMO, and with representatives from customer
firms, third party administrators, and potential resellers. Thus, given the small nature
of this entrepreneurial firm, the development team was the central node in the entire
development and deployment process. Though the preponderance of our interview
data stemmed from our ongoing meetings with the development team lead, we were
able to develop a more far-reaching and robust understanding of the entire group’s
beliefs in diverse ways. For instance, the healthcare policy expert is widely considered
to be the foremost expert in healthcare prevention in the USA. Consequently, he is often
interviewed on national (and international) news stations like CNN, and Fox. As a
result, we were able to download, transcribe, and analyze his interviews and public
speeches to gain deeper insight into his positions. Additionally, the unique access that
enabled us to analyze documentation and archival records, including confidential
emails, PowerPoint presentations, and white papers provided great means of
triangulation. Ongoing interviews with the team lead and validation with other
members of XYZ were also used to solidify our findings as they were generated. In
total, over 100 semi-structured interviews took place with a key member of the
technical leadership team, 175 e-mails were analyzed, and more than ten media
interviews were collected and analyzed.
Data analysis
We leveraged a hybrid analytical technique to analyze the data, incorporating both
inductive and deductive coding and thematic development procedures (Chiasson et al.,
2009, Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). This dual approach can be extremely rich, as
it allows creative insight to be generated from the data without the need to reinvent
valuable concepts that already exist in the literature (Denis et al., 2001;
Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998). The hybrid approach is particularly useful in novel
settings for which extant work is limited; it allowed us to begin the analytical process
by working from the data and enabled us to move from specific detail to more general
conclusions (Schwandt, 1994). Furthermore, by complementing the inductive analysis
with a deductive examination of the data, we were able to utilize the industry
infrastructure and strategic positioning frameworks to develop deeper insight from our
data. Specifically, we followed a four-step process to analyze the data (Lewis et al.,
2011).
Inductive analysis. The initial step in our analysis process was to inductively
analyze the data. In doing so, we thoroughly listened to recordings of interviews, read
notes from interviews, coded data to generate major themes that were emerging, and
discussed the data in an iterative fashion between members of the research team and
the team lead within the organization (Eisenhardt, 1989). To allow us to iterate through
the data in this fashion, we took detailed notes during each interview and judicially
reviewed and validated emerging themes in recap sessions. The interview notes
attempted to capture the heart of each conversation, and focused on key issues that the
focal firm was facing at that point in time relative to our research question. Interview
notes and recordings were listened to multiple times using a literal reading strategy
(Mason, 2002), and notes were added through each iteration to capture missing details
or emerging themes. To determine key themes, saliency (Blatt et al., 2006) and
contextual interpretation (Stake, 1995) of the significance of events, actions, or
viewpoints were used as explanatory factors rather than frequency.
Narrative construction. The second step, narrative construction, allowed us to draw
up our data and the emerging themes to construct a composite narrative of XZY’s
evolving strategy and the corresponding changes to the structure of their pack
(Dunford and Jones, 2000; Currie and Brown, 2003). In doing so, we first created a
timeline to identify the major changes that had occurred. Then, in an effort to build a
more robust narrative we placed the key themes that emerged from our inductive
analysis within the temporal context in which they were observed (Dutton and
Dukerich, 1991). Through numerous iterations while working collaboratively among
the research team we constructed a narrative explanation of what we had observed
over the multi-year period. To continuously validate our findings, we ensured that the
narrative that was emerging was supported by our data and critically interpreted by
members of XYZ.
Deductive analysis. In the next step we leveraged our two analytical lenses as top
down interpretive devices. Doing so enabled us to develop deeper insight into the
findings that emerged from the first two steps. Initially we just used the industry
infrastructure view as a method of inquiry to focus our attention on four subsystems
outlined in Van de Ven’s (2005) framework. Using the industry infrastructure view in
this way allowed us to experience and observe the interrelationships that seemed to
exist between the resources, activities, channels, trade-offs and opportunities that
dynamically adjusted to XYZ’s changing strategy. However, it was also at this point
that we started to sense a need for another analytical lens to provide greater insight
into what we had observed, and to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the
dynamic interrelationships that existed between the four subsystems. As a result, we
leveraged Porter’s positioning view of strategy to augment the industry infrastructure
view. Doing so allowed us to begin to see the interrelationship between XYZ’s position
in their pack and the corresponding changes to resources, activities, channels,
trade-offs and opportunities that we had observed.
Synthesis. Finally, the fourth step of our analysis was to synthesize our findings by
highlighting and sharpening our contributions to existing research and practice. In
doing so, we paid attention to the theoretical and practical implications that emerged
throughout our analysis while maintaining focus on prior research to further identify
and contribute to existing gaps. As we traversed through this step we used it as a final
opportunity to triangulate and validate our findings by relying extensively on our
comprehensive repository of data.
Findings: three strategic positions
Strategic position 1: Targeting self-insured employers
XYZ Health was founded in 2003 by a former orthopedic surgeon, Dr Jim Low[2], with
the goal of helping small to medium-sized self-insured employers drive down total
healthcare costs by tying incentives and disincentives to specific behaviors that impact
an individual’s health. For example, if an individual meets criteria for compliance (e.g. a
yearly check-up), she may receive reduced deductible rates and lower premiums. In
contrast, if she failed to meet such criteria she could face an increase in her deductible
and/or a change in overall coverage. It was not long into the relationship with the
Southern Clinic that Dr Low realized that information technology was going to play an
important role in monitoring such a program and in XYZ’s strategy moving forward.
According to the CTO:
XYZ wanted to offer a technology based tool to help organizations manage costs. Instead of
having it [health benefits programs and insurance] act as unmanaged entitlement programs,
we wanted to develop the technology tools to help companies manage this huge
expenditure-healthcare costs.
As a complement to the technology platform, XYZ’s early focus was to help
self-insured organizations design, implement, and manage innovative healthcare plans
to help drive down total costs for an organization by shaping new and healthier
behaviors. Thus, their initial strategic position was both needs based (self-funded
organizations needing an ePHR) and access based (small to midsize companies in the
Southeast USA), and was designed to provide a comprehensive solution to their
customers. In achieving this position, their goal was to not only provide the innovative
insurance plan design, but also to provide the electronic platform that monitored and
managed the program. This platform would track all health-related activities per
employee, manage and monitor all control mechanisms (incentives and disincentives)
that would be established to shape healthy behaviors, educate users based on personal
health issues identified through a personal health assessment, and address all of the
backend transaction processing that is part of the claims administration process.
Though they did not have the internal resources to provide claims administration
services themselves, XYZ’s initial strategy was to contract with a TPA to provide that
service for them. However, this did not last long, as they quickly realized that there
were significant costs associated with managing the relationship with the TPA and
getting involved with the claims adjudication process simply required too many
resources. Therefore, they rapidly adjusted their initial position to focus their offering
on providing the plan design and the electronic platform to monitor it, with the intent
that they would then work with a customer’s existing TPA to get access to the
necessary data. While following this strategy, XYZ’s position essentially placed them
between the employer and the TPA (see Figure 1), because their needs based position
focused on providing services to self-funded employers, thereby effectively owning the
relationship with the end customer (the employer), which was perhaps the biggest
benefit of this positioning strategy.
Trade-offs of Position 1 (data accessibility). Since a critical success factor for Insight
was the ability to pull data from many disparate sources, getting access to such data
was obviously important. To integrate electronically with the TPAs, Woody and Luke,
the core members of the development team, began by designing the underlying data
model that described how data would be represented and accessed. After the initial
data model was developed, Woody and Luke designed data extracts that identified
data points that needed to be retrieved from TPA applications to populate the
underlying database that supported the Insight application. Once the extracts were
complete, they made them available to the TPA that was providing claims
administration. To their surprise, an early TPA that they were working with
responded to their request by saying it would cost $10,000 to write these specialized
abstracts. Woody commented:
Most TPAs don’t have sophisticated technology people around to create extracts. For the
most part, to make this happen they need to hire someone to do it. We learned early on that
extracts were going to be extremely difficult to get.
Though they appreciated the abstracts that they finally did get from the TPA, Woody
was left to sift through volumes of data since the TPA was unwilling to write
specialized routines and instead gave them one large data dump. According to Woody,
“A huge part of my time was spent sifting through the volumes of data, and then
writing the custom load routines to parse out what was needed”. He continued, “The
TPA helped a little, but it was not much”. It was this experience that got Woody
wondering about the viability of their current position. He commented: “Moving
forward, if we do not partner with a TPA to create a packaged offering, we are going to
have to go through this data exercise with each customer”. Woody continued: “Data is
king and those who have it are in position to compete in this space”. Despite their
collaborative efforts to build alliances with many TPAs, XYZ continued to struggle as
they simply did not control the data source and their focus was still on providing
services to self-insured firms, not TPAs themselves. According to Woody:
If we are going to compete in this space, we have to own the data. Otherwise we are going to





time jockeying for data. That model just is not sustainable. We need to either acquire a TPA
or develop the technical sophistication to become one.
It became increasingly evident that there were clear trade-offs related to their initial
position. On the positive side they owned the relationship with the end customer and
could therefore manage the relationship to encourage innovation. Furthermore, when
XYZ owned the customer relationship and contracted with TPAs to provide the claims
processing, they at least had some influence over the TPAs since they were paying
their bill. However, the negative side of their initial position resulted when they decided
to remove the claims administration services from their offering and thereby pushed
that back onto the existing TPAs, they lost the little control they had, and were
therefore at the mercy of whichever TPA that they happened to be working with. As
Woody reiterated, “Something had to change”.
Strategic position 2: Targeting TPAs
As Version 1.0 of Insight was coming to market, the XYZ team began to question their
initial strategic position. Their original approach was based primarily on a
needs-based positioning strategy, where they focused on targeting the needs of
self-insured employers that faced rising healthcare costs. This needs-based approach,
in turn, shaped their variety-based positioning decisions, which led them to focus on
plan design and the complementary technology platform to monitor it (Insight),
thereby keeping the claims administration function in the hands of the third party TPA
that was already servicing the client account. Despite the value that can come from
owning the customer relationship and providing a one-stop-shop offering to
self-insured employers, XYZ decided after a couple of years to alter their strategic
position. Instead of delivering value to employers, XYZ was going to focus their
attention on redesigning Insight and their own internal activities to begin delivering
value to TPAs. Thus, XYZ’s new strategy was to adjust their needs based position and
begin to see the TPAs as their target customers, not the employers. Now, in effect, the
TPA would sit between the customers and XYZ, allowing the TPA to own the
customer relationships while hoping to take advantage of the many relationships
TPAs already had (see Figure 1). According to Woody:
It just made sense, if we could get the TPAs to see the value of Insight they could be a reseller
for us. Instead of us trying to establish many one-to-one relationships, we could leverage the
power of the one-to-many relationships that TPAs had [. . .] to facilitate deployment of insight
to a much broader audience.
With their new strategic position, XYZ relinquished the need to have the internal
activities that were necessary to manage many individual customer relationships as
well as an intensive outsourcing relationship with one or more TPAs. Instead, they
could reallocate those resources to building a few strong relationships with a handful
of TPAs. However, despite the inherent upside, they began to realize that by altering
their position relative to the customer, they found that there were unintended
trade-offs.
Trade-offs of Position 2 (innovation capacity and customer accessibility). As with all
strategic positions, trade-offs do exist. Position two was no different for XYZ. On the
positive side of Position 2, XYZ developed revenue sharing agreements with TPAs and
began selling and marketing Insight to these organizations, hoping that the TPAs
would then become a value-added reseller of the application. As a result of these
relationships they had access to a whole new customer base, as many TPAs already
had accounts with hundreds of potential customers. Furthermore, by integrating
tightly with one TPA it would limit the number of customized integration routines that
would need to be developed. However, on the downside, their attempt to shift their
position to focus on the needs of TPAs came with a cost. Realizing the TPAs were
locked in a commodity market and an ongoing struggle to differentiate their services,
XYZ thought that the Insight platform would be a natural extension to their existing
service offering, helping them to differentiate their services from other TPAs. However,
after many presentations and meetings, the adoption rate by TPAs was slow. In their
ongoing interaction with the TPAs, Dr Low and Woody became increasingly
frustrated. The excitement for Insight and XYZ’s offering seemed evident and this
notion was reinforced by the ongoing callbacks and meetings they would have with
specific TPAs. However, it seemed as though the TPAs were just unable to move past
the excitement phase when considering how they would deploy these solutions to their
existing customers. The industry seemed to have almost a collective identity that
focused purely on transactional efficiency in a commodity market. As expected in such
a market, excess capacity within the TPA industry seemed to create a situation where
price was the only means of competition, and the notion of innovation or differentiated
services within this industry was simply not well understood and outside the scope of
the social norm. According to Woody:
The TPAs are antiquated, not innovative in their thinking at all [. . .] they’re in a standard
commodity based industry and seem content with the status quo; it just seems like a very
difficult type of industry to penetrate as they seem to lack interest in new ideas and new
products.
XYZ learned that while the TPA had existing relationships with many customers and
were the central point for data collection, the social fabric that connected them with
their customers was simply not conducive to encouraging novel thought or innovation
outside the scope of continuously improved operational efficiencies. The TPA’s job
was to carry out the health plan instructions faithfully and continuously search for
ways to lower the costs of processing claims. The apparent inertia seemed to simply
inhibit them from moving past the status quo. Moreover, since XYZ’s new strategic
position revolved around providing services to TPAs, they subsequently lost the
ability to access employers directly. Therefore, in addition to issues with innovation
capacity within the channel, they lost customer accessibility with their new positioning
approach. In a continuous search for a means to deploy their technology enabled
services into this existing ecosystem, they began developing relationships with other
types of healthcare consulting groups that they thought they could provide services to
or in conjunction with. This included a benefits-management company, Benefito, and a
disease-management company, CareCo.
Strategic position 3: Targeting benefits and disease management companies
XYZ health developed a relationship with Benefito, a benefits company that was a
wholly owned subsidiary of a large bankers trust association in the Southern USA.
Under the bankers trust umbrella sat many distinct business units, and each unit
managed many individual banks. In an effort to gain greater visibility into healthcare
spending across the entire organization, Benefito managers sought an application that
could help them aggregate, compare, and analyze data across business units. Though
earlier versions of Insight initially seemed like a fit, it did not allow multiple groups
to be analyzed and compared against each other within the same organization. In an
effort to earn the Benefito business, Woody and Luke set out to build a hierarchical
reporting functionality into a new version of Insight. This represented yet a third
strategic position for XYZ, where they were now beginning to develop offerings for
both benefits and disease management companies. According to Woody, “This
required us to completely redo the underlying data model that we developed for 1.0”.
Fortunately, by developing this new functionality, they earned the Benefito business,
signing a contract with them in March of 2009. Despite the new business provided by
the growing Benefito relationship, Dr Low and the executive team continued to
search for new ways to deploy Insight. In doing so, they established a relationship
with a large disease management organization that provided potential access to
nearly 100,000 lives. In an effort to capture this business, Woody and Luke built a
robust disease management portal that was also part of the 2.0 release of Insight.
This functionality allowed disease managers to have access to an activity dashboard
that helped track patients who were under their care. As a part of this functionality,
disease managers had access to input screens in which they could enter key
information (such as blood pressure, weight change, etc.) into the ePHR database.
They could then access and track this information throughout their relationship with
a given individual.
Trade-offs of Position 3 (technical and relational scalability). XYZ’s most recent
decision – to maintain their existing position that focused on TPAs while also
straddling new channels – obviously provided additional opportunities to deploy their
technology enabled service offering. Yet, by expanding their needs-based positioning
strategy to so many customer groups, they were required to continually develop new
functionality and services to meet the diverse needs of their broadening customer base.
This broad market approach differs from a more niche or single condition approach
that has been taken by some rather successful ePHRs around the world, such as the
Renal PatientView, a program developed through the NHS in the UK. The problem
with the broad market approach for XYZ was that the new functionality and services
resulted from activities that were not necessarily compatible across all channels, and
therefore as they invested time and resources in one channel they were essentially
taking them away from another, a clear trade-off. In other words, they were unable to
develop either technical or relational scalability as their focus expanded across all of
three unique channels. Technical scalability results from leveraging technology
investments across multiple customer accounts, thereby lowering the marginal costs
required to service such accounts. Relational scalability works the same way. By
leveraging relational investments (such as with a TPA) across multiple customers’
accounts, they could spread those costs out thereby lowering their marginal costs
required to obtain and service new accounts.
Summary. A summary of key trade-offs identified from XYZ’s shifting strategic
positions is shown in Table I.
Discussion
We have presented findings from an in-depth case study that explores how a start-up
firm adjusts its strategic position within its pack to facilitate the development and
deployment of Insight, an ePHR. XYZ has successfully developed the innovation
through multiple versions and deployed it across a range of customer types. However,
despite some early success, they continue to struggle with the most effective strategic
position for deploying the innovation. Each strategic position they have chosen
(i.e. direct, indirect, and multi-channel) has come with unanticipated trade-offs that
challenge the viability of their business model. To further understand why, we coupled
the industry infrastructure framework (Van de Ven, 2005) with core concepts from the
strategic positioning school to interpret how XYZ’s proprietary activities impact the
structure of their pack, and, in turn, impact their ability to develop and deploy Insight
in this complex context. In light of these findings, our study makes important
contributions to theory and practice.
Construct Definition Case illustration
Data accessibility The relative ease of obtaining and
accessing data outside of the firm
When XYZ contracts with a TPA to
provide backend claims processing
their influence leads to an increase
in data accessibility. When they
consider TPAs as their customers,
they lose that influence and data
accessibility decreases
Innovation capacity The capacity to identify and
allocate resources that link and
facilitate the movement of the
innovation from the point of
production to the point of
consumption
When XYZ adopted the strategy of
working exclusively through TPAs,
they become removed from the end
customer. The TPA channel
seemed to lack the organizational
cognition necessary to reconfigure




The relative ease of getting access
to the end customer in order to
establish market conditions and
establish buying behavior
When XYZ owns the customer
relationship, they are able to
influence directly the customer
buying behavior. Alternatively, if
the TPA or another entity controls
the customer relationship, XYZ
must work through that channel to
shape behavior
Technical scalability The ability adapt the technical
platform to accept increased
volume from new and potentially
diverse customer accounts without
significant system customization
XYZ struggled to scale their
technical platform with their multi-
channel strategy given the diversity
of these potential customers
Relational scalability The ability to adapt the relational
antecedents that enable seamless
integration with new customer
accounts without significant
relationships specific investments
XYZ’s best strategy to scale
relationally was to leverage
existing relationships with TPAs.
However, the multi-channel
strategy would create a strain on
trying to adapt efficiently to the







Proprietary activities shape strategic position
Running in packs is an essential strategy for firms looking to develop and deploy ePHR
technologies. In doing so, firms must broadly consider how their proprietary activities
transform the resources and institutional arrangements in a way that enables them to
compete for customers that demand ePHR solutions or to create that demand. Van de
Ven’s (2005) industry infrastructure framework broadly depicts these infrastructure
components and encourages firms to “run in packs” by focusing on their technical
competence, outsourcing non-core aspects of the business, and being politically savvy.
We noticed that running in packs is a negotiated process that takes place over time,
and that how the players in a pack collaborate and adjust their positions has trade-offs
in terms of how the technological innovation is developed and deployed. We observed
changing pack structures by looking at how XYZ’s strategic position changed relative
to other firms in the pack and to the ePHR end users[3]. We also looked at XYZ’s
strategies in attempting to broaden its access to more customers by working through
indirect and multi-channel relationships. These provided a view of distinctive pack
structures in terms of how XYZ intended to interface with customers and collaborate
with other pack members. Our findings indicate that when the structure of the pack
changes, there are important implications related to the ability of a firm to access key
resources, adjust institutional arrangements to shape standards, and align channels to
facilitate deployment. Furthermore, we also noticed that there seemed to be an inherent
lack of awareness as to how changes in strategic position corresponded to changes in
the structure of the pack. Thus, the members of XYZ were reacting to strategic
challenges that they faced when they adopted a new strategic position, but did not
anticipate these prior to making their next move. These findings highlight the inherent
challenge of broadening one’s perspective to the network view when we are embedded
in a particular context and focused on day-to-day activities. It begs the question,
“Could XYZ have known about the obstacles that they would encounter prior to
making adjustments to their strategic positions?”. Our hope is that through studies
such as this one we will further emphasize the importance of a network (or pack) based
view for individuals working in firms both large and small.
Strategic position impacts power and access to key resource endowments
As in all pack formations, some players have control over resources that others need. In
this case, the TPA is the nexus of the data required to populate Insight. This notion is
recognized by Miller et al. (2009) when they note that claims and billing players have
the best source of complete data to populate an ePHR. From a broader network
perspective, the TPAs central position and many connections would indicate a high
degree of power and influence over other firms within the pack (Wasserman and Faust,
1994). However, our findings indicate that XYZ’s relative position to the end consumer
and the TPA, the services they offer, and how they deliver these services has important
implications on their ability to counteract the power that TPAs have, and thereby the
accessibility of key resources. Because of their early proprietary activities and
resulting strategic position, XYZ owned the customer relationship and provided a full
range of services, including claims administration, which was enabled through an
outsourcing deal that they negotiated with a TPA. Thus, XYZ effectively positioned
themselves between the customer and the TPA, acting as a broker between the two
firms. Through their brokerage role, XYZ gained influence over the TPA through
contractual control and direct access to the end customer. Therefore, their strategic
position had clear implications on the level of power they had over other firms in a
pack. Such influence was needed to get the electronic data feeds that were required to
populate Insight. When XYZ adjusted their strategic position to stop providing claims
administration services and instead targeted TPAs as their customers, too, they traded
their brokerage role for access to a broader customer base. In doing so, their strategic
position changed and the power distribution was again altered in favor of the TPAs.
Accordingly, in the context of ePHRs, our findings indicate that a firm’s position within
a pack clearly impacts their ability to access the crucial data that is needed to populate
an ePHR. In addition to issues of data accessibility, XYZ became acutely aware of other
tradeoffs they faced as a result of their changing position within their pack. Our
findings support the sizeable precedent in the network literature that views a firm’s
position within a pack as a resource from which it can draw on to support its
proprietary activities (Gulati et al., 2000; McEvily and Zaheer, 1999). XYZ began to
realize that opting out of owning the customer relationship, in turn, made them
dependent upon the TPA for access to potential customers.
Strategic position impacts power and institutional arrangements
Institutional arrangements impact the formulation of standards that shape behaviors
within and across firms (Van de Ven, 2005). A key value of Insight was the low
marginal costs for adding new users to the system, an important factor that would
impact XYZ’s profitability over time. Yet, this was dependent on XYZ’s ability to
develop an ePHR application that could be standardized and therefore efficiently
replicated across new implementations. As discovered, many core aspects of Insight
could be replicated across customer organizations with little need for customization.
Yet, creating the integration mechanisms to enable data to flow from a given TPA to
Insight proved timely and costly. As XYZ moved away from playing the brokerage
role and contracting with a small number of TPAs to provide a full breadth of services
to end consumers, they now had to respond to the requests of a given TPA that was
looking to resell Insight. In a sense, they went from having the power that comes from
being a broker and a consumer with many alternatives (there are many TPAs they
could contract with) to being at the mercy of any TPA that was considering using
Insight in one of their existing customer relationships. This illuminates issues related
to the technical scalability of Insight, and helps to broaden Van de Ven’s notion of
technical competence which is critical when organizations decide to run in packs. Our
findings suggest that technical competence is not simply a “choose it and compete
proposition” that Van de Ven may be suggesting. Rather, it is capability that is
entangled with a firm’s proprietary activities and strategic position, and is dependent
on where a firm sits relative to other firms within a given pack, and therefore it has
clear costs and benefits associated with it. Thus, the power a firm has within a pack
has clear implications on their ability to influence other firms to adopt standards that
facilitate data integration. This in turn significantly affects a firm’s ability to develop
technical scalability in the context of ePHR development and deployment.
Strategic position impacts channel and market consumption
XYZ’s strategy to relinquish control of the customer relationships and broaden their
strategic position changed how the entire pack deployed the ePHR innovation by
altering the final tie that connected the pack with the end consumer. In other words, it
altered the final channel that is responsible for deploying the ePHR innovation from the
pack that developed it to the end user who will use it. Our findings suggest a nuanced
approach to understanding why these distinct customer channels have differing
capacities to effectively deploy an ePHR innovation because some are more or less
conducive to facilitating the adoption of technical innovations. Furthermore, they
illuminate that the pack’s channel alignment relative to the end customer affects the
overall innovation capacity of the entire pack. As Van de Ven points out, the essence of
the political savvy needed for firms to run in packs is that firms must “recognize the
interests of key actors and enroll them to one’s viewpoint” (Van de Ven, 2005, p. 371).
The importance of persuasion within and across groups to mobilize collective action is
seen across many theoretical frameworks, including actor network theory (Callon,
1986), and is therefore not specific to Van de Ven’s focus on the importance of political
savvy. As Callon (1986) identified, in the second stage of network formation
(interessement) other actors become interested in the solution proposed and begin to
shift their affiliations. Over time, XYZ began to recognize that the TPAs interests were
not well aligned with their interests in expanding and constructing a market for ePHRs
and value-based health plans, and therefore the TPA-customer channel seemed less
suitable for delivering the innovation. Thus, from an ANT perspective, they were never
able to get through the interressement stage. Despite what seemed like an obvious
opportunity, TPAs resources and capabilities were aligned with a lean strategy of
serving as many customer claims as efficiently as possible. They were locked into a
commodity-based market where they faced intense competitive rivalry over price.
Furthermore, there seemed to be clear norms surrounding the relationships between
TPAs and their customers, norms that kept people keenly focused on price while
seemingly less willing to explore opportunities for innovation. Thus, the final channel
that connects the pack with the end consumer leads to differing norms that can be more
or less conducive to the effective deployment of ePHRs.
This research shows that the development and deployment of employer sponsored
ePHRs is a complicated process that requires the effective negotiation of many
differing players with often competing objectives. It shows that running in packs is a
useful meta-lens for investigating how firms in knowledge intensive industries can
cooperate to introduce new technologies into the marketplace. Yet, in applying the lens
to the context of IT development and deployment, firms must move beyond thinking
about being politically savvy, and pay close attention to how differing strategic
positions (and corresponding changes to pack structures) can lead to important
trade-offs between market opportunities and resource accessibility, scalability, and
channel suitability. In doing so, they will become more aware of the dynamic
interrelationships between the four subsystems identified by Van de Ven (2005). In
short, we propose that this awareness will lead to a higher likelihood that the industry
infrastructure sub-systems and a firm’s proprietary activities will support
knowledge-intensive innovation. As firms understand the relationship between their
proprietary activities and how these shape pack structure and infrastructure
sub-systems we expect a higher likelihood of ePHR deployment success.
Limitations
Clearly, the biggest trade-off of this study is the ability to generalize outside of its
current context so that we could focus more specifically on ePHR development and
deployment for self-insured employers. However, we believe the inductive and engaged
approach applied here could be used in future research to determine the types of
temporal patterns associated with small firms in other domains that are attempting to
simultaneously develop and deploy knowledge-intense technologies. Another fruitful
area for future research involves gathering the insights from other pack players
directly (e.g. TPA, human resource managers of employers, etc.) and looking more
broadly at the development of ePHRs outside of the self-insured employer market. In
this study, our approach explicitly focused on how a start-up firm, XYZ, interpreted
their strategy and activities relative to other pack players, and how this interacted with
their changing development and deployment activities. Given that running in packs
assumes that firms will simultaneously cooperate and compete with other pack
members, our exploration reveals how a single firm can interpret and act according to
how they make sense of their environment and actions (Weick, 1995). This perspective
is important when coupled with the dynamic nature of juxtaposing the rapid nature of
start-up firms with the changing landscape of healthcare and IT.
Conclusion
Generally, there are three ways that ePHRs develop in the marketplace to achieve the
aggregation of clinical data and healthcare knowledge. First, consumer-driven
applications like Google Health[4] and Microsoft HealthVault provide digital platforms
for storing personal healthcare information. These services depend upon individuals to
take responsibility for the aggregation of their own healthcare data. Second,
self-contained eco-systems such as managed care organizations (Kaiser Permanente) or
government-sponsored programs (Veterans’ administration) develop proprietary
systems for their own use. Third, in what is largely driven by entrepreneurial
ventures, employer-driven applications take data aggregation out of the hands of the
individual, acting as electronic data aggregators by pulling healthcare data from many
disparate sources and using it to populate ePHRs for each employee. From this latter
perspective, our findings illustrate the benefits of a small, nimble firm seeking to
quickly adapt to meet perceived market needs as well as the drawbacks that exist
within a complex network of multiple interdependencies. Approaching these networks
from a systems orientation should enable entrepreneurs to consider a wider variety of
potential patterns and feedback that may stem from strategic positioning choices.
These findings also underscore the importance of taking time to reflect and learn from
the trade-offs that exist between distinct strategic positions. Often, healthcare
entrepreneurs come from a healthcare background and are able to clearly identify
where inefficiencies and improvement opportunities exist. However, they may have not
stopped to consider the complex ecosystem of companies that exists within the
healthcare industry and the interdependencies that exist between constituents. As our
study shows, doing so is crucial. Table I of this study is an excellent starting point for
anticipating and assessing the relational consequences of operating within a network
such as the one illustrated in the case. We would anticipate that for various start-up
activities some of the categories noted may be inconsequential while others may need
to be added. For those conducting additional research in these topics we suggest that
exploring this issue may lend itself to the development of more robust mid-range
theoretical views that are sensitive to issues pertaining to entrepreneurship in the
healthcare domain. Clearly, due to regulatory and political reasons the complexity of
each healthcare ecosystem will vary as well. Research would benefit by isolating the
commonalities as well as differences across different countries and their systems, and
as we have indicated already, the differences are abundant. In addition to illuminating
the contextual factors that impact the development and deployment of ePHRs, our
study provides three core contributions.
First, we approached this study from an inductive, explorative stance which led to
important insights for the development and deployment of employee sponsored
ePHRs. Drawing on the industry infrastructure (Van de Ven, 2005) and strategic
positioning views (Porter, 1980, 1996) we explored issues related to resource
dependencies that surround development and deployment initiatives. This perspective
led us to juxtapose a temporal view of how XYZ proposed and acted on different
strategic positions, and the trade-offs that impacted their ability to gain access to key
resources or influence the pack in a way that supports ePHR deployment success.
Second, this study elaborates on Van de Ven’s recognition that firms need to be
politically savvy to successfully run in a pack. We believe that if firms (like XYZ)
better understand the consequential relations between their proprietary activities,
strategic positions, and the impact to ePHR critical success factors (issues of resource
accessibility, scalability, and channel suitability), they will be more likely to develop
strategies that support the successful deployment of knowledge-intensive innovations
in the healthcare context. Lastly, we applied the industry infrastructure lens in a novel
way by incorporating temporal and structural (Porter, 1980, 1996) aspects to how a
firm’s proprietary activities and strategic position draw upon and are shaped by
institutional arrangements, resource endowments, and market consumption. While the
prior view of an industry infrastructure implies a dynamic nature, this study provides
further theoretical development in that direction by applying it to a distinct case of
innovation in a real life context. Moreover, in exploring these dynamic relationships,
our longitudinal, process oriented, and deeply engaged approach heeds the call from
recent scholars suggesting the need for research that explores the underlying
generative mechanisms that help explain performance outcomes in organizational
settings (Poole et al., 2000).
Notes
1. “Self-funded plan: An insurance arrangement in which the employer assumes direct
financial responsibility for the costs of enrollees’ medical claims. Employers sponsoring
self-funded plans typically contract with a third party administrator or insurer to provide
administrative services for the self-funded plan. In some cases, the employer may buy
stop-loss coverage from an insurer to protect the employer against very large claims”
(Kaiser, 2009, p. 184).
2. All names have been disguised to protect confidentiality.
3. Defining which firms to include in a pack can be challenging because clear boundaries often
do not exist. In this study we follow the advice of Laumann et al. (1983) and adopt a
position-based approach to boundary specification. We focus on firms that hold formally
defined positions within the pack and exclude all others.
4. As of January 1, 2012, Google Health has ceased operations. Users were offered options to
export their data to other services such as Microsoft HealthVault.
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Appendix. Understanding the industry infrastructure for ePHRs
The self-funded employer-based model of insurance is one in which employers bear the risk of
paying for healthcare rather than an insurance plan. Figure A1 shows a simplified version of this
model where the employer provides a health plan to the employee and is then responsible for all
costs beyond the deductible. The employee then contracts with doctors, clinics, hospitals, and
health-related providers for services.
Two challenges not identified in Figure A1 are that:
(1) doctors, hospitals, labs, pharmacies, etc., likely have different electronic health record
systems; and
(2) not all systems are electronically based.
As a result, there are potentially numerous connections between the employer and employees as
indicated in Figure A2.
Challenges in the information flow and collection of health-related information exist because
of the difficulty in obtaining clinical care data, which includes data from physician-patient
interactions, labs, procedures, tests, hospitals and clinics. Because self-funded employers would
have to dedicate many resources to establishing and maintaining interfaces with these
healthcare providers, many draw upon a third-party administrator (TPA) to provide billing,
establish eligibility, manage the payment process, and adjudicate claims. Such administrators
effectively aggregate the connections between the employer and providers. Figure A3 illustrates
the role that the TPA plays in aggregating data flow to and from healthcare providers.
The inclusion of a TPA does help to aggregate and centralize the clinical data necessary for
billing. However, it also means that the TPA, as an established industry player, has access to
many employers with potential ePHR users. In this position, TPAs are in a stronger position to
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